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Abstract. In this paper, we tackle a complex real-world problem:
trainee allocation for primary school teachers in a French teaching
Academy. This complex real-world problem can be reduced into the well-
known Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem. However, the most difficult
part consists of generating the preference lists according to the real con-
straints, priorities and wishes. Additionally, we adapt the Swing method
to the HR problem and we apply it to this real-world problem in order to
balance the different objectives. In this way, the Swing method decreases
the management cost of the operation.
1 Introduction
Many real-world problems can be understood as matchmaking problems in which
two sets need to be paired up: the assignment of junior physicians to hospitals [1],
staff to faculties [2], students to colleges [3], children to schools [1,4], online
matrimony [5], etc. Whatever the application domains are, the problem consists
in finding the best matching between individuals. This problem was first studied
in [6] which provides a constructive proof showing that every instance admits at
least one admissible solution.
In this paper, we tackle a complex real-world problem: trainee allocation for
primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy (in French, IUFM). For
this purpose, the University Institute for Teachers Training has a program to
allocate training practices according to the desiderata of trainees and the con-
straints of the supervisors. In order to be assigned, each teacher selects and
orders two areas where she wants to be assigned. Additionally, priority is given
to trainees having more children, then those working part-time and finally those
with no car. Conversely, the diplomas of supervisors and the distances between
the trainees and the supervisors allows to prioritize them. In order to manage
the increasing number of recruitments, the allocation, which is performed man-
ually, must be automated. It is worth noticing no optimization method can be
applied due to scalability issues. This complex real-world problem can be re-
duced into the well-known Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem [6]. However,
the most difficult part consists of generating the preference lists according to
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the real constraints, priorities and wishes. Additionally, when we apply the ex-
isting algorithm for solving this problem we promote one community (e.g. the
average distance) or another (e.g. the priority over trainees). Actually, even if
the solution given by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is stable, it is the best one for
one community but the worst for the other community [7]. By contrast, a recent
method aims at reaching “fair” outcome: Swing [8]. In this paper, we adapt
the Swing method to the HR problem and we apply it to a complex real-world
problem in order to balance the different objectives. Since some constraints are
relaxed, the Swing method decreases the management cost of the operation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of
our work. We adapt the Swing method in order to tackle this problem. Then,
we present the real-world problem we address and we compare the solutions
computed by the modified Swing method with some classical algorithms. Finally,
section 5 discusses some related works and section 6 concludes.
2 Background
The Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem was first defined in [6]. This problem
is a many-one generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage Problem.
In the HR problem, each man corresponds to a resident and each woman
corresponds to a hospital which can potentially be assigned to multiple residents
up to some fixed capacity.
Definition 1 (HR). An instance of Hospitals / Residents problem of size
(n,m), with n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1, is a couple HR = 〈H,R〉 with |H | = n and |R| =
m defined such that:
– H = {h1, . . . , hn} is a set of n hospitals. Each hospital h ∈ H has a positive
integral capacity, denoted ch, indicating the number of posts that h has. Each
hospital h ∈ H has a preference list, denoted pih, in which its ranks an
acceptable set of residents in strict order;
– R = {r1, . . . , rm} is a set of m residents, each resident r ∈ R has a preference
list, denoted pir, in which she ranks an acceptable set of hospitals in strict
order.
Given any individual z ∈ H∪R, and given any potential partners p1, p2 ∈ H∪R,
z is said to prefer p1 to p2 if both p1 and p2 are in piz and p1 precedes p2 on z’s
preference list piz.
A solution for an instance of HR is an assignment of residents in posts for
each of the hospitals. The assignment of a resident is an hospital, possibly none
(denoted θ). The posts of an hospital are residents, possibly the empty set.
Obviously, the assignment is mutual. Considering the assignmentM , if aM (rk) =
θ, rk is said to be unassigned, otherwise rk is assigned. Similarly, a hospital
hk ∈ H is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed if the corresponding number
of residents in posts (denoted |pM (hk)|) is less than, equal to, or greater than ck,
respectively. In a matching, no resident is assigned to an unacceptable hospital,
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no hospital offers a post to an unacceptable resident, each resident is assigned
to at most one hospital and no hospital is oversubscribed.
A matching for an instance of HR is stable there is no potential couple, called
blocking pair, which threats the current matching. A blocking pair prefers to be
assigned together rather than according to the current matching. Considering a
matching M for a HR problem, a couple (h, r) is blocking if r prefers h to her
current assignment and: either h is undersubscribed; or h prefers r to at least
one of its posts. A stable matching is called an admissible solution.
[6] provides a constructive proof showing that every instance of HR admits
at least one admissible solution: an algorithm called the resident-oriented Gale-
Shapley algorithm (RGS for short). In RGS, each unassigned resident, which is
not desperate (alone and with a non-empty preference list), sends a proposal to
her preferred hospital which accepts. If this latter is oversubscribed, then the
hospital fires the worst resident having a post in this hospital. If the hospital is
full, it deletes from its preference list all the residents who are worst than the
residents having a post and reciprocally.
A counterpart of the RGS algorithm, known as the hospital-oriented Gale-
Shapley algorithm (HGS for short), involves hospitals offering posts to residents.
In HGS, each hospital which is not desperate (undersubscribed and with at least
one resident in its preference list which is not assigned to it) proposes a post
to the best one who accepts. If the resident was already assigned to a different
hospital, then the resident is first unassigned. Then, the resident deletes from
her preference list all the hospitals which are worst than the current hospital
and reciprocally.
The RGS algorithm terminates with the resident-optimal stable matching
(denoted Mr) in which each assigned resident has the best hospital that she
could achieve in any stable matching and each unassigned resident is unassigned
in every stable matching.Mr is worst-possible for the hospitals : ifM is any other
stable matching, then every hospital h ∈ H prefers each resident in pM (h) to
each resident in pMr (h) \ pM(h). The HGS terminates with the hospital-optimal
stable matching (denoted Mh) in which every full hospital h is assigned with
its ch best partners and every undersubscribed hospital is assigned to the same
set of residents in every stable matching. In Mh, each assigned resident has the
worst hospital that she could achieve in any stable matching and each unassigned
resident is unassigned in every stable matching. In general, there may be other
stable matchings which cannot be reached by these two algorithms.
3 Swing
We adapt here the method Swing which was initially proposed in [8] to solve
Stable Marriage Problem in order to tackle HR. Swing may reach some stable
matchings which are not the output of RGS and HGS.
In the RGS and HGS algorithms, each community is given a role (proposer
or responder). In the Swing method, the agents (residents or hospitals) alterna-
tively play both of them in many bilateral negotiations from which the solution
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emerges. Swing realizes the minimal concession strategy [9] to reach a stable
matching in order to be more equitable than the outputs of RGS and HGS.
Based on this strategy, an agent goes first to its preferred partner. If that fails,
the agent concedes, which consists in the withdrawal of its expectation, and so
it sends a proposal to the following partners in its preference list. Meanwhile,
the potential partners play the role of responder: these agents receive some pro-
posals they can accept or reject depending on their concession levels. When all
the agents are fully assigned or desperate, the Swing method stops.
The Swing method adopts an agent-based methodology for solving an eco-
nomics problem of matchmaking since it focus on the interaction between the
agents and the link between their satisfaction and the market. In the Swing
method, each hospital and each resident is represented by an agent a ∈ H ∪R.
At each step, the agent a is represented by a concession level (κa ∈ [0, |pia|]) and
its assignment status (σa ∈ {⊤,⊥}). We note piz [1] the most preferred partner
of z, piz [2] the second most preferred partner of z, and so on. If piz[k] = λ, then
regretz(λ) = k. We define the concession level as the maximum rank in the
preference list that the agent considers as acceptable at a certain time. κz = 1
means that the agent focus on its most preferred partner and so the other po-
tential partners are not acceptable. A resident r is fully assigned (σr = ⊤) if
she is assigned (aM (r) 	= θ). A hospital h is fully assigned (σr = ⊤) if it is full
(|pM (h)| = ch). Initially, σa = ⊥ and κa = 1 for all the agents. The preference
lists pia are different from one agent to another.
In Swing, hospitals propose and residents respond alternatively (cf Algo. 1).
In the odd steps, the hospitals play the role of proposers and the residents play
the role of responders. In the even steps, the roles are swapped. Each proposer
sends a proposal to the acceptable partners from the preferred ones to the least
preferred ones. As soon as a responder accepts this proposal:
1. the proposer and the responder may divorce;
2. the proposer and responder are assigned;
3. the concession level of the proposer/responder are moved such that, if they
are fully assigned, then they will only accept better partners.
It is worth noticing that, at each step, a proposer stops to send proposals as soon
as it is fully assigned. If all the responders reject its proposals, the proposer will
concede. When all the agents are fully assigned or desperate, the Swing method
stops. An agent is desperate if this is an hospital (resp. a resident) which is
undersubscribed (resp. unassigned) and it has reached the maximal concession
level (the preference list has been fully explored).
At each step, the proposer and the responder may divorce (cf Algo. 2). If a
member of the new couple is fully assigned, its previous (or one of its previous)
partner is unassigned and so this latter may need to concede.
4 Practical Application
In this section, we present the real-world problem we tackle: the trainee allocation
for primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy. For this purpose, the
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Algorithm 1. Swing method
Data: HR = 〈H, R〉
Result: a assignment M
1 M ← ∅;
2 step← 0;
3 while ∃a ∈ A, σa = ⊥ ∧ κa < |pia| do
4 if step is even then
5 proposers← R;
6 responders← H ;
7 else
8 proposers← H ;
9 responders← R;
10 forall the p ∈ proposers do
11 for (i = 1 ; i ≤ κp ; i++) do
12 r ← pip[i];
13 //p sends a proposal to r
14 if regretr(p) ≤ κr then
15 //r accepts this proposal
16 divorce(p,r);
17 if p is a Resident then
18 res← p;
19 hos← r;
20 else
21 res← r;
22 hos← p;
23 aM (res)← hos;
24 pM (hos)← pM (hos) ∪ {res};
25 σres ← ⊤;
26 κres ← regretres(hos)− 1;
27 if σhos = ⊤ then
28 κhos ← regrethos(res)− 1;
29 else
30 κhos ← regrethos(res) + 1;
31 break;
32 else
33 //r rejects this proposal
34 if σp = ⊥ then
35 κp ← min(κp + 1, |pip|);
36 step++;
37 return M
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Algorithm 2. a and b may divorce
Data: a and b
1 if a is a Resident then
2 r ← a;
3 h← b;
4 else
5 h← a;
6 r ← b;
7 if σr = ⊤ then
8 h2 ← aM (r);
9 if σh2 = ⊤ then
10 κh2 = min(regreth2(r) + 1, |pih2 |);
11 aM (r)← θ;
12 pM (h2)← pM (h2) \ {r};
13 if σh = ⊤ then
14 r2 ← minp(h);
15 aM (r2)← θ;
16 pM (h)← pM (h) \ {r2};
17 σr2 = ⊥;
18 κr2 = min(regretr2(h) + 1, |pir2 |);
University Institute for Teachers Training (in French IUFM) has a program
to allocate training practices according to the desiderata of trainees and the
constraints of the supervisors. We show here how this real-world problem is
modeled and can be computed with the HR solving methods.
4.1 Overview
Each teacher must complete 3 internships, one per each quarter. Conversely,
each supervisor can manage at most 2 trainees for each quarter. The region is
divided into some areas and subareas. Each subarea is composed of cities where
schools are located. In order to be assigned, each teacher expresses two wishes,
i.e she selects and orders two areas where she wants to be assigned.
The problem is represented in Fig. 1 with an ER-model. The supervisors teach
in different classrooms. Each classroom is included in one or more levels. The
French primary education is divided into three levels:
– level L1 includes 3 classrooms called TPS, PS and MS;
– level L2 includes 3 classrooms called GS, CP and CE1;
– level L3 includes 3 classrooms called CE2, CM1 and CM2.
When a supervisors teaches in a classroom which is included in a level, we
consider she teaches at this level. However, if she simultaneously teaches in GS
and MS (or PS), then we consider she also teaches at level L1.
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Fig. 1. ER model representing the inputs and the output of the problem
The IUFM aims at assigning an internship per quarter for each trainee re-
specting her wishes. Moreover, the IUFM wants to minimize the refunding due to
the travels. That is the reason why we add the relation ”Distance” between the
homes of trainees and the cities where schools are. The distinction between these
two entities allows to decrease the number of distances which are computed.
Priority is given to trainees having more children, then those working part-
time and finally those with no car. Conversely, the diplomas of supervisors (EMF,
CAFIPEMF or MAT) allows to prioritize them. Finally, the IUFM aims at minimiz-
ing the number of employed supervisors.
4.2 Mapping
An instance of Primary School Teachers problem (PST) is a couple PST =
〈S, T 〉 where S is a set of supervisors and T is a set of trainees. An instance
of PST can be reduced into 3 instances of HR, each of them corresponding to
a quarter. In order to solve an instance of PST, we generate the corresponding
instances of HR, solve them and translate the solutions.
Let us consider an instance of PST. In order to reach the assignment Wi for
the quarter i, we transform PST into an instance HRi in order to compute a
matching with RGS, HGS or Swing. This matching Mi allows to deduce Wi.
Informally, the transformation is performed using Tab. 1.
The mapping between the agents for an instance PST and the agents for an
instance of HR is performed by a bijection. For each quarter, the corresponding
instance of HR is generated and resolved. Therefore, Mi is translated into Wi.
The transformation of an instance of PST into an instance of HR is per-
formed in 3 steps. Firstly, supervisors are mapped to hospitals and trainees are
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Table 1. Mapping between HR and PST
PST HR
Supervisor Hospital
Trainee Resident
Constraints, priorities, and wishes Preference list
mapped to residents. Secondly, the preference lists of residents and hospitals are
generated. Finally, the instance of HR is returned.
The most difficult part consists in generating the preference lists of HR accord-
ing to the real constraints, priorities, and wishes within PST expressed by the
trainees and supervisors. The preference lists of residents are generated as fol-
lows. Firstly, the preference list of a resident is set up with the hospitals which
map with the supervisors in accordance with the wishes of the corresponding
trainee. Secondly, these hospitals are divided in accordance with the levels of
the corresponding supervisors in order to give priority to the levels which are
not performed by the corresponding trainee. Finally, the hospitals corresponding
to supervisors who teach in classrooms already practiced by the corresponding
trainee are deleted. The generation of the preference lists for the hospitals is
performed as follows. For each hospital, the preference list is set up with the res-
idents who consider it. Residents are sorted according to the number of children
of the corresponding trainee, then according to the working time, and finally
according to the car.
4.3 Experiments
We consider here data for the 2012 trainee allocation. 356 junior teachers must
find 3 training practices supervised by one of the 783 senior teachers. As de-
scribed previously, we transform this instance of PST into 3 instances of HR.
Then, we resolve them using RGS, HGS or Swing (see Algo. 1). It is worth notic-
ing no optimization method have been applied such as SMP2 [10] or DisFC [11]
due to scalability issues. The experiments have been performed by a MacBookPro
(2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 with 8 Go RAM). Each method reaches a solution in
around twenty minutes. 80 % of the computational time is consumed by the
generation of the preference lists which are different for each quarter since: i)
the supervisors must be sorted according to the wishes, the diplomas, the dis-
tance and the levels which are not performed; ii) the trainees must be sorted
according to the number of children of the corresponding trainee, then accord-
ing to the working time, and finally according to the car. The assignments are
denoted WRGS , WHGS and WSwing.
Table 1 compares the outcomes of the three methods. We can note that all
the trainees are allocated according to these methods. Indeed, the number of
available supervisors is greater than the number of trainees. Contrary to HGS,
the RGS algorithm - which promotes the trainees - and the Swing method, allow
(almost all trainees) to perform a training practice at each level. Whatever the
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method used, all the matchings are compliant with the wishes expressed by the
trainees. Even if the HGS algorithm does not give priority to trainees, HGS as the
RGS algorithm give the priority to the first wishes of trainees. Its seems that this
soft constraint is relaxed by the Swing method. The average distance between
the home of a candidate and the place of the training practice is lower for WRGS
(promoting trainees) thanWHGS . The average distance forWSwing is in between.
Since some constraints are relaxed, the Swing method allows to decrease the cost
of management (by reducing the number of employed supervisors) much more
than HGS and RGS.
Table 2. Overview (at top) and distribution of trainees/diplomas (at bottom)
Criteria WRGS WHGS WSwing
Trainees with 3 practices 356 356 356
Trainees with 3 levels 348 266 356
Trainees with wish # 1 185 190 65
Average distance (km) 22.26 29.29 23.58
Nb of supervisors 496 348 64
Diploma WRGS WHGS WSwing
EMF 41.23 % 32.02 % 15.78 %
CAFIPEMF 39.13 % 27.05 % 6.89 %
MAT 18.76 % 21.16 % 10.14 %
Table 1 shows the distribution of supervisors over diplomas. For instances,
41.23 % of supervisors having the best diploma (EMF) are required by the RGS
algorithm. The RGS and HGS algorithms employ the supervisors with the best
diplomas as much as possible. The RGS algorithm involves more specifically the
supervisors with the best diplomas since the preference list of the trainees are
generated depending on these diplomas. Since the Swing method involves only
64 supervisors (12 with EMF, 44 with CAFIPEMF and 7 with MAT), it is hard
to say if the matching takes into account the diplomas of the supervisors.
As said previously, priority is given to trainees having more children, those
working part-time and finally those who have no car. Table 3 summarizes for each
of these categories, the number of trainees and the average distance. In 2012, few
trainees having children are involved. That is the reason why we cannot check
that the average distance decreases when the number of children increases. If we
consider only trainees with no child, it seems that the trainees working part-time
are promoted. Since the trainees with no car represent two-thirds of the cohort,
the corresponding rule cannot be applied whatever the algorithm is.
Table. 4 summarizes and compares the outcomes of our three methods. ++,
+, and -, means that a criteria is completely, moderately and badly fullfilled
respectively. According to our experiments, no method seems to satisfy all the
criteria. While RGS seems to give priority to trainees (level coverage, average
distance, diploma), HGS is adapted to give priority to the supervisors (i.e. chil-
dren, part-time, car). The Swing method balances both aspects. Actually, this
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Table 3. Average distances for trainees
Nb of Work. Car Nb of WRGS WHGS Wswing
child. time trainee
Part No 0 - - -
4 Yes 0 - - -
Full No 1 2.01 20.20 2.01
Yes 0 - - -
Part No 0 - - -
3 Yes 0 - - -
Full No 2 5.84 67.90 6.78
Yes 0 - - -
TPS No 0 - - -
2 Yes 0 - - -
Full No 1 45.79 45.80 45.79
Yes 5 10.79 16.30 11.45
TPS No 0 - - -
1 Yes 1 6.92 73.90 7.38
Full No 12 17.03 20.20 17.35
Yes 2 6.34 81.90 8.18
TPS No 13 7.58 15.00 7.94
0 Yes 9 19.39 16.30 19.92
Full No 202 27.43 35.70 29.01
Yes 108 20.42 22.60 17.68
method seems to relax the constraints related to the wishes. Since these con-
straints have been relaxed, the Swing method allows to increase the coverage of
levels and to decrease the number of supervisors who are employed and so, the
management cost of the matching.
5 Related Works
The most famous real-world application for matchmaking problems is the Na-
tional Resident Matching Program (NRMP) which manage the entry-level labor
market for new physicians in the United States [1]. Each year, approximately
20,000 jobs are filled. In 2012, 38,777 aspiring medical residents applied for 26,772
available resident positions. For this purpose, each applicant submits a rank or-
der list of positions for which she has interviewed and each residency program
submit a rank order list of applicants they have interviewed and the number of
positions to fill. Even if the number of participants for this application is greater
than in our experiments, it is a straightforward application of the HR problem
while solving a PST problem requires the generation of complex preference lists.
College admissions in China are centralized processes via standardized tests [3].
Therefore, the same preferences list is generated according to the test scores for
all the schools. The Gale-Shapley algorithm is used for public school admissions
in Boston and New-York [1]. Since, the inputs include the preferences of pupils
over school and the priority levels of pupils (a pupil has priority to attend the
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Table 4. Comparison of the methods for solving HR applied to an instance of PST
Criteria RGS HGS Swing
3 training practices ++ ++ ++
3 levels + − ++
Wishes + + −
Distance ++ − +
Nb. of supervisors − + ++
Priority to diplomas ++ + ?
Priority to children ? ? ?
Priority to part-time + + +
Priority to ”no car” − − −
same school as an older sibling, pupils who are living in the school’s walk zone
have priority), the generation of the preference lists for schools is quite simple.
In the daycare system in Denmark [4], priorities are imposed by local munici-
pality (e.g. all schools give priority to their currently enrolled children and to
the children with special needs). Therefore, the generation of priority is also
straightforward.
In [5], the application domain is online matrimony in India. They propose to
generate the preference list of participants according to the characteristics of the
potential partners using fuzzy analytical hierarchy process considering multiple
criteria. This method performs pairwise comparison of candidates attribute-wise
since both women and men value physical attributes, such as age and weight, and
those choices are assortative along age, height and education. Even if this appli-
cation requires the generation of complex preference lists, the resulting matching
is not evaluated.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed a complex real-world problem: trainee alloca-
tion for primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy. Since we have
presented the inputs and the outputs of such problem called Primary Schools
Teachers (for short, PST), we have shown that an instance of PST can be re-
duced into 3 instances of the well-known Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem.
However, this transformation requires the generation of complex preference lists.
The preference list of each resident takes into account the wishes of the corre-
sponding trainees, the diplomas of the supervisors, the distance between them,
etc. The preference list of each hospital takes into account the priority over
trainees which depends on the number of children, if they are part-time and if
they have cars. In order to solve the corresponding instances of HR, we have
tried the classical algorithms (the resident-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm and
the hospital-oriented Gale-Shapley) and we have also adapted a ”fair” method
called Swing. Our first experiments seem to be in conformance with the fact
that this latter balances the criteria which promote the trainees (e.g. average
distance) and the criteria which promote the supervisor (i.e the priority over
206 M. Morge and E. Piette
the trainees). Since some constraints are relaxed, the Swing method decreases
the number of supervisors who are employed and so the management cost of the
operation. However, it would be interesting to confront our first conclusion with
the data of future campaigns.
References
1. Roth, A., Peranson, E.: The redesign of the matching market for american physi-
cians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. AER 89(4), 748–780 (1999)
2. Baiou, M., Balinski, M.: Admissions and recruitment. AMM 110(5), 386–399 (2003)
3. Zhang, H.: Analysis of the Chinese college admission system. PhD thesis, University
of Edinburgh (2009)
4. Kennes, J., Monte, D., Tumennasan, N.: The daycare assignment problem. Tech-
nical report, Department if Economics and Business, Aarhus University (2011)
5. Joshi, K., Kumar, S.: Matchmaking using fuzzy analytical hierarchy process, com-
patibility measure and stable matching for online matrimony in india. Journal of
MCDA 19, 57–66 (2012)
6. Gale, D., Shapley, L.S.: College admissions and the stability of marriage. AMM 69,
9–14 (1962)
7. Knuth, D.: Mariage stables. Les Presses de l’Universite´ de Montre´al (1971)
8. Everaere, P., Picard, G., Morge, M.: Minimal concession strategy for reaching
fair, optimal and stable marriages (extended abstract). In: Proc. of AAMAS,
pp. 1319–1320 (2013)
9. Rosenschein, J., Zlotkin, G.: Rules of encounter: designing conventions for auto-
mated negotiation among Computers. MIT press (1994)
10. Gelain, M., Pini, M., Rossi, F., Venable, K., Walsh, T.: Local search algo-
rithms on the stable marriage problem: Experimental studies. In: Proc. of ECAI,
pp. 1085–1086 (2010)
11. Brito, I., Meseguer, P.: Distributed stable matching problems. In: van Beek, P.
(ed.) CP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3709, pp. 152–166. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
